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Abstract 
The concept of sustainable development epitomizes theoretical frameworks advocating in favor 
of at least maintaining the rate of development attained in the previous period. Traditionally, 
development was viewed from a narrow dimension that focused primarily on the development 
of the economy. However, with time, development has gathered emphasis from a broader 
perspective incorporating economic, social and environmental welfares into consideration. 
However, corruption is perceived to be a major factor inhibiting sustainable development all 
around the globe. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the corruption-sustainable 
development nexus from the perspective of select 47 countries across Asia, Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC). The paper attempts to estimate the elasticities of 
socioeconomic and environmental development indicators with regard to corruption and other 
macroeconomic fundamentals using annual data from 2000 to 2015. In addition, the paper also 
tests the Environmental Kuznets’s Curve hypothesis in a panel framework and estimates the 
threshold levels of income at which the environmental degradation takes place with economic 
growth. Panel unit root and cointegration tests are used while the Three-Stage Least Squares 
(3SLS) estimation technique is employed to calculate the associated elasticities. Moreover, in 
order to check the robustness of the relationships, Panel Vector-Error Correction Model (VECM) 
and Granger causality test are also considered to understand the short run and long-run causal 
associations between the variables. In light of the estimated results, corruption is found to have 
a negative relationship with socioeconomic development across the Asian, African and LAC 
subpanels. In addition, corruption negatively affects environmental development in the context 
of the Asian and African subpanels while positively affecting in context of the LAC subpanel. 
Moreover, the findings also suggest that the EKC hypothesis holds true only in the cases of the 
full panel and the LAC subpanel, with the threshold per capita GDP being around 12,000 US$ 
and 12,780 US$, respectively. Our paper also finds short run bidirectional causality between 
corruption and socioeconomic development in the context of all the countries cumulatively 
which did not hold to be true in the long run. Furthermore, corruption and CO 2 emissions 
portray short bi-directional causality in context of the selected Asian economies and a 
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unidirectional causality running from corruption to CO2 emission for all the economies as a 
whole.   
 
1. Introduction   
 
Development and its sustainability have been the core agenda of economies all around 
the globe. It is believed that development is meaningless if it cannot be sustained over 
and over again. There are many ways in which the concept of sustainable development 
had been put forward in existing literature. The United Nations (UN) classified 
sustainable development as a systematic process through which the short run demands 
are met without axing the longer run demands (World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987). The utmost importance of sustainable development, from a 
multidimensional aspect, has also recently been brought to the limelight through the 
UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) declaration on 25th September 2015. The 
SDGs as a whole is a successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
comprises of 17 global goals with 169 targets aimed at ensuring sustainable 
development worldwide. Basically, the SDGs form a backdrop to minimization and 
gradual elimination of all the micro and macroeconomic factors that inhibit the 
development of the economy, society and the environment across the globe. 
Traditionally, development was viewed from a narrow dimension that focused 
primarily on the development of the economy through increments in national incomes. 
Nations, in quest of expediting their economic growth rates, specifically concentrated 
on industrialization without putting much emphasis on the other non-economic welfare 
issues. However, with time, development had gathered further significances from a 
broader perspective via the addition of the social and environmental welfare policies to 
the economic development policies already in action. The foundations of social 
development are based on the fact that attainment of mere economic welfare does not 
guarantee social welfare as well since the economic welfare distributions may not 
disseminate proportionately among the population. Thus, economic development at 
times may not match the corresponding social development aspects. In addition, human 
resource development is also believed to be interconnected to social development which 
ultimately would complement the overall socio-economic development of a nation 
(Terziev and Georgiev, 2017). Simultaneously, environmental development has also 
been acknowledged recently following the worldwide concerns regarding the global 
climate change adversities taking place. It is believed that in absence of environmental 
sustainability, the progress made with respect to socioeconomic development across the 
world could well be undermined and reversed due to the environmental pressures that 
have accumulated over the years (OECD, 2012). Thus, sustainability of development 
can be classified as a cumulative process of ensuring economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. In this regard, a transition from non-renewable to 
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renewable energy-use is often believed to complement the energy-sustainability targets 
of the government worldwide (Murshed 2018; Murshed 2019a; Murshed 2019b).  
However, corruption is considered to be one of the major issues that can hold up the 
development drives (Murshed and Ahmed 2018). Although corruption is sometimes 
argued to foster development mainly due to it being the grease to the squeaky wheels of 
bureaucracy, the long-term impacts clearly outweigh the short-run benefits. Corruption 
usually hampers the development strategies making the associated strategies ineffective 
in reaching the desired national goals optimally. It is believed that in the presence of 
corruption a nation is always likely to be below par in attaining its economic, social and 
environmental developments. Thus, investigation of the impacts of corruption on the 
multi-dimensional macroeconomic indicators of development has always been a crucial 
area of research amongst economists and policymakers worldwide. Reinikka and Smith 
(2004) portrayed a negative relationship between corruption and economic 
development by asserting that rising corruption rates severely dampens national 
incomes in economies. Likewise, corruption and its attributes to upholding societal 
development had also been analyzed by researchers. According to Gupta et al. (2000), 
curbing the rates of corruption within an economy can lead to social development in the 
form of lower child and infant mortality rates reduced the percentage of babies with 
low birth-weights and declined number school dropouts. On the other hand, the 
adverse impact of corruption on the aggregated socioeconomic development of an 
economy is also acknowledged in the literature. For instance, corruption in the context 
of the education sector deteriorated human resource development in Russia which 
could eventually lead to unfavorable impacts on its economic development as well 
(Osipian, 2012). Finally, linkages between rising corruption levels and environmental 
degradation, jeopardizing environmental sustainability, have also been explained in 
studies by Islam (2016) and Liao et al. (2016). It is believed that corruption restrains 
application of laws aimed at mitigating environmental pollution whereby 
environmental sustainability as put to the sword at times.   
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the corruption-sustainable development nexus 
from the perspective of select 47 countries across Asia, Africa and LAC (see table 11 in 
the appendix for the list of the countries). The paper attempts to estimate the elasticities 
of socioeconomic and environmental development indicators with regard to corruption 
and other macroeconomic fundamentals using annual data from 2000 to 2015. In 
addition, the paper also tests the Environmental Kuznets’s Curve (EKC) hypothesis in a 
panel framework and estimates the threshold levels of income at which the 
environmental degradation takes place with further economic growth. Although there 
had been a plethora of studies focusing on the separate effects of corruption on 
socioeconomic and environmental sustainability, our paper fills the gap in the empirical 
literature by analyzing the corruption-development association under a simultaneous 
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equations model framework. The following questions have been particularly addressed 
in our paper: 
1. Does corruption impede attainment of socioeconomic and environmental development? 
2. Does corruption diminish the efficacy of public and private investments? 
3. What are the possible causal associations between the three dimensions of development 
and corruption?    
4. Does the EKC hypothesis hold in presence of corruption? If yes, what is the threshold 
level of economic growth? 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
corruption, socioeconomic and environmental development trends across Asia, Africa 
and LAC. This is followed by a review of relevant literature in section 3. The model 
specification and attributes of data considered in this paper are given in section 4. 
Subsequently, chapter 5 describes the econometric methodologies employed all 
throughout the paper while chapter 6 reports the estimated results. Finally, chapter 7 
makes concluding remarks and sheds light on possible policy implications. 
 
2. An Overview of Corruption, Socioeconomic and Environmental 
Indicators across Asia, Africa and LAC 
 
2.1. Trends in Corruption 
The CPI scores and corruption rankings of different countries across Asia, Africa and 
LAC are provided in table 1. Corruption has always been a grueling phenomenon 
across South and Southeast Asian regions. Statistical evidence suggests that South Asia 
has gone on to become the world's most corrupt region (Transparency International, 
2014) whereby the development within this region has been scrutinized to a large 
extent. Despite the efforts to counter corruption practices in the South Asian countries, 
nominal improvements have been accounted for over the recent past (The Economist, 
2017). Moreover, the corruption rankings, as done by the Transparency International 
(TI), of most of the South Asian countries exhibited declining trends between 2015 and 
2016 (Transparency International, 2016a) which raises concerns regarding the 
sustainable development issues within this region. According to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) figures in 2016, Bangladesh heads the list of South Asian 
regions in terms of being relatively more corrupted compared to India, Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan. Likewise, corruption has been a problem for the Southeast Asian economies as 
well. It has been estimated that almost 1% of the total economic growth annually is 
forgone courtesy corruption practices in the ASEAN since most of the associated 
member countries rank high in corruption (ASEAN Studies Program, 2016). The 
region’s corruption vulnerability has affected its investments over the years. According 
to the businessmen’s perceptions of bribery, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam 
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lie in the bottom tier of most corrupt countries globally (Transparency International, 
2015). In contrast, Malaysia has done well in tackling its corruption issues compared to 
Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, maintaining an average CPI score of 50.25 in 
between 2012 and 2015.  
The corruption scenario in African countries is dismal too and the 2016 African elections 
have made matters even worse. Poor governance and unethical behavior of the police 
within this region has accounted for low CPI scores on average all throughout Africa 
(United Nations, 2016). The average CPI score within the Sub Saharan African region in 
2016 was 31, which is lower than any average CPI score across the globe. Moreover, 
89% of all the African nations depicted CPI scores of less than 50 in 2016 (Transparency 
International, 2016a). It is to be mentioned that despite the adoption of several anti-
corruption measures, South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya have failed to get hold 
of the corruption phenomenon in these countries, resulting in high levels of CPI and 
bribery perceptions. Within this region, Somalia and Ghana were the worst decliners in 
CPI scores in 2016 (Banoba, 2017). Amongst the Sub Saharan African nations in 2016, 
Somalia was classified as the most corrupt country while Botswana emerged as the least 
corrupt economy, both having CPI scores of 10 and 60, respectively.           
The menace of corruption has also skyrocketed across the LAC nations as well. The 
average CPI score in this region was 44 in 2016, which reflects the associated 
governments’ ineffectiveness in implementing anti-corruption policies and acts. In light 
with the results from a survey conducted by the TI, two out of three people on average 
feel that corruption is on the rise within their economies while half of the people also 
expressed their unhappiness following payment of a bribe to avail public services 
(Pring, 2017). Mexico led in terms of perceptions of bribery in 2016 while Venezuela, 
having a CPI score of 17, was termed as the highly corrupt nation within the LAC 
region (Transparency International, 2016b). A major attribute of corruption in the LAC 
region was lack of cooperation from the police in these countries. 47% of the people, 
surveyed by TI in 2016, felt that their respective police departments were the most 
corrupt in nature.  
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Table 1: Corruption scenario in selected Asian, African and LAC nations (2015-2016) 
 
CPI CPI CPI Score Difference CPI 2016 CPI 2015 Rank difference 
Country 2016 2015 (2016-2015) Rank Rank (2015-2016) 
Asia 
Bangladesh 26 25 1 145 139 -6 
India 40 38 2 79 76 -3 
Indonesia 37 36 1 90 88 -2 
Malaysia 49 50 -1 55 54 -1 
Pakistan 32 30 2 116 117 1 
Philippines 35 35 0 101 95 -6 
Sri Lanka 36 37 -1 95 83 -12 
Thailand 35 38 -3 101 76 -25 
Africa 
Angola 18 15 3 164 163 -1 
Botswana 60 63 -3 35 29 -6 
Cameroon 26 27 -1 145 130 -15 
Central African Republic 20 24 -4 159 145 -14 
Chad 20 22 -2 159 147 -12 
Gambia 26 28 -2 145 123 -22 
Ghana 43 47 -4 70 56 -14 
Kenya 26 25 1 145 139 -6 
Madagascar 26 28 -2 145 123 -22 
Malawi 31 31 0 120 111 -9 
Mali 32 35 -3 116 95 -21 
Mauritius 54 53 1 50 45 -5 
Mozambique 27 31 -4 142 111 -31 
Namibia 52 53 -1 53 45 -8 
Niger 35 34 1 101 98 -3 
Nigeria 28 26 2 136 136 0 
Republic of Congo 20 23 -3 159 146 -13 
Senegal 45 44 1 64 61 -3 
Sierra Leone 30 29 1 123 119 -4 
Somalia 10 8 2 176 167 -9 
South Africa 45 44 1 64 61 -3 
Sudan 14 12 2 170 165 -5 
Tanzania 32 30 2 116 117 1 
Uganda 25 25 0 151 139 -12 
Zimbabwe 22 21 1 154 150 -4 
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Latin America and Caribbean 
Argentina 36 32 4 95 106 11 
Brazil 40 38 2 79 76 -3 
Chile 66 70 -4 24 23 -1 
Costa Rica 58 55 3 41 40 -1 
Ecuador 31 32 -1 120 106 -14 
El Salvador 36 39 -3 95 72 -23 
Haiti 20 17 3 159 158 -1 
Jamaica 39 41 -2 83 69 -14 
Mexico 30 31 -1 123 111 -12 
Panama 38 39 -1 87 72 -15 
Paraguay 30 27 3 123 130 7 
Peru 35 36 -1 101 88 -13 
Uruguay 71 74 -3 21 21 0 
Venezuela 17 17 0 166 158 -8 
 
   Source: Transparency International (2016a) 
 
2.2. Stylized Facts on Socioeconomic Development  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) can be referred to as a key indicator of 
socioeconomic development within an economy since it ranks countries in terms of 
their healthcare, education and income per capita statistics as a whole. In the context of 
South Asia, Sri Lanka, as per the HDI report published by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) 2016, heads the list with an HDI score of 0.757 in 2015 
followed by India, Bangladesh and Pakistan with scores 0.624, 0.579 and 0.550, 
respectively. However, the HDI growth rate in Sri Lanka in 2015 is slower than many of 
the South Asian neighbors (Ramakrishnan, 2016). On the other hand, Bangladesh has 
been the forerunner accounting for the highest annual HDI growth rate of 1.64% 
between 1990 and 2015 amongst the South Asian economies (UNDP, 2017). Amongst 
the Southeast Asian economies, only Singapore and Brunei Darussalam have been 
classified as countries with very high human development, having HDI scores of 0.925 
and 0.865 and HDI rankings of 5 and 30, respectively. Recently, Vietnam had surpassed 
Philippines in terms of HDI ranking mainly due to the nation’s improvement in income 
inequality scenario (UNDP, 2016a).  On the other hand, Cambodia registered the 
highest rate of HDI improvement from 2014 to 2015 with an average growth rate of 
1.84%, which was relatively higher than the average HDI growth rate across East Asia 
and Pacific (Khemer Times, 2017).  
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Likewise, most of the world economies, the African countries on average also depicted 
a positive trend in terms of HDI improvement stepping into 2015 from 2014 (UNDP, 
2016a). The average HDI score in this region was 0.497. According to the UNDP, the top 
three African economies in 2015 were Seychelles, Mauritius and Algeria with 
corresponding HDI scores of 0.782, 0.781 and 0.745. Conversely, Central African 
Republic, Chad and Niger were languishing at the bottom of the list with disappointing 
HDI scores of 0.352, 0.356 and 0.393, respectively (Woods, 2017). However, high rates of 
income inequality have also simultaneously exerted adverse impacts on these 
economies. It has been estimated that almost 32% of HDI scores are marginalized when 
adjusted with income inequality (Copley, 2017). Moreover, almost 50% of the African 
nations belong to low human development status which is a concerning issue when it 
comes to attainment of SDGs within these economies by 2030. 
The LAC region is comparatively better off than the South Asian, Southeast Asian and 
African countries in terms of HDI scores. The average HDI score in this region was 
0.751, slightly higher than the average HDI score in high human development countries 
with HDI score of 0.746 on average. In the context of the Caribbean economies, Jamaica 
in 2015 registered an HDI score of 0.730 indicating an impressive annual HDI 
improvement growth rate of 12.1% between1990 and 2015. However, the nation’s 
inequality woos curb its HDI score and rank improvement by almost 16.6% (Campbell-
Livingston, 2017). In the Latin American region, Venezuela held on to its high human 
development nation tag in 2015, having a higher HDI ranking than its regional 
neighbors Brazil, Peru and Columbia. However, Venezuela’s HDI performance was 
even more impressive in the sense that the country managed to attain favorable 
outcomes in the HDI components despite the ongoing economic turmoil following 
adverse oil price shocks. Over the period of 2000 and 2015, the country's HDI scores 
improved by more than 13% (UNDP, 2016b). A detailed overview of the HDI 
components regarding the countries considered in this study is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: HDI components across Asia, Africa and the LAC in 2015 
HDI 
Rank 
Country 
HDI 
 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) 
Expected years 
of schooling 
Mean years 
of schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP $) 
Asia 
59 Malaysia 0.789 74.9 13.1 10.1 24,620 
73 Sri Lanka 0.766 75.0 14.0 10.9 10,789 
87 Thailand 0.740 74.6 13.6 7.9 14,519 
113 Indonesia 0.689 69.1 12.9 7.9 10,053 
116 Philippines 0.682 68.3 11.7 9.3 8,395 
131 India 0.624 68.3 11.7 6.3 5,663 
139 Bangladesh 0.579 72.0 10.2 5.2 3,341 
147 Pakistan 0.550 66.4 8.1 5.1 5,031 
Africa 
64 Mauritius 0.781 74.6 15.2 9.1 17,948 
108 Botswana 0.698 64.5 12.6 9.2 14,663 
119 South Africa 0.666 57.7 13.0 10.3 12,087 
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125 Namibia 0.640 65.1 11.7 6.7 9,770 
135 Congo 0.592 62.9 11.1 6.3 5,503 
139 Ghana 0.579 61.5 11.5 6.9 3,839 
146 Kenya 0.555 62.2 11.1 6.3 2,881 
150 Angola 0.533 52.7 11.4 5.0 6,291 
151 Tanzania 0.531 65.5 8.9 5.8 2,467 
152 Nigeria 0.527 53.1 10.0 6.0 5,443 
153 Cameroon 0.518 56.0 10.4 6.1 2,894 
154 Zimbabwe 0.516 59.2 10.3 7.7 1,588 
158 Madagascar 0.512 65.5 10.3 6.1 1,320 
162 Senegal 0.494 66.9 9.5 2.8 2,250 
163 Uganda 0.493 59.2 10.0 5.7 1,670 
165 Sudan 0.490 63.7 7.2 3.5 3,846 
170 Malawi 0.476 63.9 10.8 4.4 1,073 
173 Gambia 0.452 60.5 8.9 3.3 1,541 
175 Mali 0.442 58.5 8.4 2.3 2,218 
176 Congo (Dem.) 0.435 59.1 9.8 6.1 680 
179 Sierra Leone 0.420 51.3 9.5 3.3 1,529 
181 Mozambique 0.418 55.5 9.1 3.5 1,098 
186 Chad 0.396 51.9 7.3 2.3 1,991 
187 Niger 0.353 61.9 5.4 1.7 889 
188 Central African Republic  0.352 51.5 7.1 4.2 587 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
38 Chile 0.847 82.0 16.3 9.9 21,665 
45 Argentina 0.827 76.5 17.3 9.9 20,945 
54 Uruguay 0.795 77.4 15.5 8.6 19,148 
60 Panama 0.788 77.8 13.0 9.9 19,470 
64 Costa Rica 0.776 79.6 14.2 8.7 14,006 
71 Venezuela 0.767 74.4 14.3 9.4 15,129 
77 Mexico 0.762 77.0 13.3 8.6 16,383 
79 Brazil 0.754 74.7 15.2 7.8 14,145 
87 Peru 0.740 74.8 13.4 9.0 11,295 
89 Ecuador 0.739 76.1 14.0 8.3 10,536 
94 Jamaica 0.730 75.8 12.8 9.6 8,350 
110 Paraguay 0.693 73.0 12.3 8.1 8,182 
117 El Salvador 0.680 73.3 13.2 6.5 7,732 
163 Haiti 0.493 63.1 9.1 5.2 1,657 
Source: UNDP (2016b) 
2.3. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emission trends  
 
The global susceptibility to adverse climate changes has drawn the attention of 
environmentalists and policymakers worldwide. Thus, environmental sustainability has 
become a concerning issue dominating the national and international agendas across 
the globe. UNDP has referred CO2 emissions as one of the key drivers of environmental 
degradation contributing heavily to the global greenhouse effect. Table 3 provides the 
trends in annual per capita CO2 emission in the countries considered in this paper, 
between 2000 and 2015. In general, low and middle income countries are classified as 
the top CO2 emitting nations compared to the high income countries. Furthermore, 
growth in CO2 emission is believed to peak in context of transitional economies (Ritchie 
and Roser, 2017). Statistical reports suggest that China has historically been a major 
contributor to global CO2 emissions. China’s total annual volume CO2 emissions went 
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past that of the rest of the world in 2010 and the trend has continued till date (Olivier, 
2017). Moreover, the geographic location of South Asian nations makes these regional 
countries highly vulnerable to negative externalities of environmental pollution 
through CO2 emissions in particular. India has pioneered in terms of CO2 emissions in 
South Asia, closely followed by Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (see table 3). In 
contrast, Malaysia is the leading emitter of CO2 amongst the Southeast Asian nations 
considered in this paper, emitting around 8 metric tonnes of CO2 per capita in 2015.  
It is to be mentioned that the average per capita CO2 emission in the South Asian and 
Sub Saharan African economies is comparatively lower than that in the North American 
countries. In the African region, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe 
respectively have the lowest and highest volume of per capita CO2 emission in 2015. On 
the other hand, Venezuela is has classified itself as a leader in the Latin American 
region in terms of per capita CO2 emission in 2015, accounting for almost 6.2 metric 
tonnes of CO2 emission per capita. Conversely, Haiti is at the most favorable position 
amongst the LAC countries emitting only 0.25 metric tonnes of CO2 per capita in 2015 
(World Bank, 2017).       
Table 3: Trends in per capita CO2 emissions in Asia, Africa and LAC (2000-2015) 
Country 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Asia 
Bangladesh 0.212 0.275 0.394 0.448 
India 0.980 1.069 1.397 1.665 
Pakistan 0.768 0.888 0.946 0.904 
Sri Lanka 0.549 0.625 0.659 0.839 
Indonesia 1.245 1.508 1.768 2.007 
Malaysia 5.423 6.800 7.772 7.913 
Philippines 0.940 0.867 0.905 1.014 
Thailand 2.879 3.782 4.195 4.501 
Africa 
Angola 0.580 0.980 1.243 1.287 
Democratic  Republic  of Congo  0.017 0.027 0.031 0.056 
Cameroon 0.225 0.212 0.340 0.276 
Central African Republic  0.071 0.057 0.059 0.065 
Chad 0.021 0.040 0.043 0.051 
Republic  of Congo 0.325 0.264 0.451 0.606 
Kenya 0.331 0.238 0.294 0.306 
Nigeria 0.622 0.763 0.577 0.560 
Tanzania 0.078 0.140 0.154 0.217 
Uganda 0.059 0.076 0.116 0.131 
Sudan 0.159 0.274 0.345 0.313 
Botswana 2.187 2.207 2.326 2.909 
Madagascar 0.119 0.095 0.093 0.130 
Malawi 0.076 0.067 0.075 0.074 
Mauritius 2.268 2.684 3.132 3.277 
Mozambique 0.075 0.087 0.113 0.244 
Namibia 0.865 1.137 1.428 1.484 
Gambia 0.199 0.203 0.256 0.260 
Ghana 0.332 0.325 0.406 0.527 
Mali 0.075 0.070 0.064 0.076 
Niger 0.061 0.053 0.071 0.109 
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Senegal 12.791 13.296 14.813 16.446 
Sierra Leone 14.333 10.024 10.246 10.246 
South Africa 18.387 19.478 20.230 20.462 
Zimbabwe 24.265 15.211 18.347 23.447 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Argentina 3.836 4.141 4.558 4.671 
Brazil 1.871 1.858 2.133 2.502 
Chile 3.853 3.828 4.252 4.688 
Costa Rica 1.395 1.617 1.665 1.642 
Ecuador 1.641 2.203 2.441 2.681 
Haiti 0.160 0.224 0.213 0.253 
Jamaica 3.880 3.825 2.590 2.651 
Mexico 3.916 4.299 3.958 3.939 
Panama 1.911 2.053 2.515 2.434 
Peru 1.169 1.345 1.961 1.929 
Paraguay 0.696 0.661 0.821 0.856 
El Salvador 0.979 1.070 1.048 1.018 
Uruguay 1.598 1.737 1.893 2.118 
Venezuela 6.224 6.164 6.513 6.139 
Source: World Bank (2017). 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1. Corruption and Economic Growth Literature  
 
Many studies over the years have focused on the corruption and its impacts on 
attainment of economic development. For instance, Mikaelsson and Sall (2014) probed 
in the corruption-economic growth nexus in context of 40 developing countries. The 
authors performed OLS estimation techniques to estimate a linear regression model in 
which GDP growth rate per capita was expressed as a function of corruption and other 
growth determinants. The regression results confirmed that in the presence of 
corruption economic growth in the developing countries, as a whole got stalled and 
declined over time, suggesting a negative relationship between these two 
macroeconomic indicators. The results corroborated to those found by Ibraheem et al. 
(2013) who used similar methodology and to deduce a negative association between 
corruption and economic growth in Nigeria.  
The intertemporal causal association between corruption and level of GDP was 
analyzed by Lučić et al. (2016) for a panel of 40 countries. The study used relevant data 
spanning across 1995 and 2011 for theoretical analysis incorporating the narrative 
method and for empirical analysis tapping normative method. The authors basically 
wanted to understand the degree of causality running from corruption to economic 
growth in the short, medium and long-term periods of five, 10 and 15 years, 
respectively. The associated Pearson correlation coefficient values revealed that the 
causality is strongest in the medium periods compared to the other two time periods 
considered.  
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The menace of corruption impeding growth in the Chinese provinces was investigated 
by D’Amico (2015). The study was based on the conceptual framework put forward by 
Barro (1998) and used a similar regression model holding the provincial incomes in the 
Chinese economy as a function of corruption prevention efforts and several other 
determinants of national income. Relevant annual time series data from 1998 to 2003 
was employed for performing OLS estimation and also for a cross-province correlation 
analysis between corruption and economic growth. The findings asserted that 
corruption indeed exerted a detrimental impact on the provincial incomes in China 
whereby an increase in corruption prevention efforts by 1 percentage point 
simultaneously led to a rise in income level by 0.002 percentage points.  
 
3.2. Corruption and Healthcare and Education Literature 
 
The nexus between healthcare expenditure and corruption was analyzed by Gupta et al. 
(2000). They used annual time series data accumulated from 128 advanced and 
developing countries, between 1985 and 1997, and employed OLS estimation and 
Instrumental Variable (IV) method. The healthcare regression model consisted of health 
status as the dependent variable while corruption and other control variables were held 
as the regressors. In light of the findings, Gupta et al. (2000) concluded that corruption 
hampered healthcare development in the aforementioned countries resulting in higher 
child and infant mortality rates and a greater percentage of low-birth weights. They 
referred to corruption as a barrier against delivery of social services including 
healthcare and education. The findings are in line with those by Sharma (2010) who 
asserted that corruption and politics are the main reasons behind Nepal being ranked as 
the lowest healthcare providing country in South Asia.          
On the other hand, Dridi (2014) analyzed the effects of corruption in the education 
sector in a cross-country analysis between 103 countries, using annual data spanning 
from 1980 to 2002. The paper employed linear regression models expressing multiple 
indicators of education as functions of corruption index and other control variables that 
can affect the education indicators. Cross-sectional analyses were carried out tapping 
the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and OLS methods. The results confirmed that 
corruption adversely affects education quality and enrolment rates. The estimated 
results also revealed that an increase in corruption index by one point led to a drop in 
the secondary school enrolment rate by 10 percentage points, validating the negative 
nexus between education and corruption. The conclusions can be linked with the 
remarks made by Jajkowicz and Drobiszova (2015) in which the authors have found a 
negative relationship between corruption and government expenditure on the 
education sector in the context of 21 OECD countries. The authors asserted that a rise in 
the corruption level tends to exert a crowding out effect marginalizing the education 
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expenditure while increasing public expenditure on defense and general public 
services. These findings corroborate the inferences made by Delavallade (2006). 
According to Delavallade, corruption distorts the public expenditure allocations 
resulting into reduction in government spending for education sector development 
purposes. 
 
3.3. Corruption and Environment Literature  
 
The effects of corruption with regard to environmental sustainability has been analyzed 
in literature holding harmful gaseous emissions as a proxy for environmental 
degradation. For instance, Ünver and Koyuncu (2017) investigated the nexus between 
corruption and CO2 emissions in the context of a panel of 173 countries between 1995 
and 2013. The authors estimated two regression model, fixed and random effects model 
in which CO2 emission was thought to be determined three measures of corruption and 
other control variables. In addition correlation analysis between the variables was also 
performed. The results from the regressions revealed a statistically significant positive 
association between all three measures of corruption and volume of CO2 emissions in 
the aforementioned panel. This implied that corruption is indeed a threat to 
environmental sustainability in these countries. The negative impact of corruption on 
the environment of 29 provincial states of China was also put forward by Lao et al. 
(2012). The findings revealed that anti-corruption initiatives in China seem to have 
effective impacts in reducing Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) emissions in China.  
          
4. Model Specification and Data 
 
This paper employs two core regression models particularly to identify the effect of 
corruption on socioeconomic and environmental development indicators across Asia, 
Africa and the LAC. The regression models are given by: 
                                                                ……(i) 
                                                                …….(ii) 
 
where HDI  is Human Development Index (used as a proxy to denote socioeconomic 
development within the panel), CPI is Corruption Perceptions Index (used as a proxy to 
capture the effect of corruption), GDP is Gross Domestic Product per capita (used to 
denote the standard of living), GOV is the government size, FAID is net official 
development assistance received, FDI is foreign direct investment inflows, TRADE is 
the volume of exports and imports and CO2 is the per capita carbon dioxide emission. 
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Model (i) is employed to understand the effect of corruption and other macroeconomic 
variables on the socioeconomic development indicator variable, HDI. HDI is a 
commonly used proxy in the sense that HDI calculation incorporates healthcare, 
educational and standard of altogether. In contrast, model (ii) is hired to analyze the 
effect of corruption and other factors on CO2 emissions affecting environmental 
sustainability. In addition, this model also investigates the EKC hypothesis (Dinda, 
2004) by incorporating a squared term of the variable GDP. Relevant data spanning 
from 2000 to 2015 was acquired in the context of all the countries considered in the 
paper.  The units of the variables used and the corresponding data sources are provided 
in table 4.  
Table 4: The units and sources of the variables considered in the paper 
Variable Units Source 
HDI Number United Nations Development  Programme (UNDP) 
CPI Number Transparency International 
CO2 metric tonnes per capita  World Bank 
GDP current US$ World Bank  
GOV % of GDP World Bank 
FAID Current US$ World Bank  
FDI % of GDP World Bank 
TRADE % of GDP World Bank  
    Note: Data of all the variables were accumulated for the period between 2000 and 2015. 
 
5. Methodology 
 
5.1. Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Estimation 
Endogeneity problem in data series is a key issue whereby the OLS estimation 
assumptions are violated making this regression methodology inappropriate. Thus, the 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) simultaneous equations model estimation technique 
(Zellner and Theil, 1962) provides the solution to the endogeneity problem faced in the 
OLS estimation. For instance, heteroscedasticity in data violates one of the assumptions 
of OLS estimation method, however, in the 3SLS method although the structural error 
terms may be correlated across the simultaneous equations, it is assumed that within 
each equation the error terms are both serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic.     
The term 3SLS reflects a certain mechanism of estimation that combines a set of 
simultaneous equations model, sometimes known as Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR), with Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation. It is basically a type of 
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation that allows correlations of the unobserved error 
terms across several equations and enhances the efficiency of equation-by-equation 
regression by considering such correlations across the simultaneous equations. Unlike 
the 2SLS approach for an array of simultaneous equations, which separately estimates 
the slope coefficients of each equation, the 3SLS methodology estimates all coefficients 
instantaneously. The estimation technique hinges on the assumption that each equation 
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is at least just-known since unknown equations are not considered in the 3SLS 
estimation. As the name suggests, the 3SLS estimation procedure involves estimation of 
a model of simultaneous equations in three stages. In the first stage, 2SLS method is 
incorporated to estimate the residuals of the simultaneous equations. The second stage 
involves the addition of the optimal instrumental variable using the estimated residuals 
to develop the disturbance variance-covariance matrix. Finally, the third stage involves 
a joint estimation of the set of simultaneous equations using the optimal instrument. 
This was followed by the panel unit root tests and cointegration analysis which are 
prerequisites for performing the causality analyses. 
  
5.1. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
Engle and Granger (1987) showed that a VECM is an appropriate method to model the 
long-run as well as short-run dynamics among the cointegrated variables. Causality 
inferences in the multi-variate framework are made by estimating the parameters of the 
following VECM equations. 
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zt-1 is the error-correction term which is the lagged residual series of the cointegrating 
vector.  The error-correction term measures the deviations of the series from the long 
run equilibrium relation.  For example, from equation (iii), the null hypothesis that X 
does not Granger-cause Y is rejected if the set of estimated coefficients on the lagged 
values of X is jointly significant.  Furthermore, in those instances where X appears in the 
cointegrating relationship, the hypothesis is also supported if the coefficient of the 
lagged error-correction term is significant.  Changes in an independent variable may be 
interpreted as representing the short run causal impact while the error-correction term 
provides the adjustment of Y and X toward their respective long run equilibrium.  Thus, 
the VECM representation allows us to differentiate between the short- and long-run 
dynamic relationships. The Chi-Square test statistic is used to determine the short run 
causalities between pairs of variables in the model. 
 
5.1. Granger Causality Test 
 
When we take y and x as our variables of interest, then the Granger causality test 
(Granger, 1969) determines whether past values of y add to the explanation of current 
values of x as provided by information in past values of x itself. If previous changes in y 
do not help explain current changes in x, then y does not Granger cause x. In a similar 
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way, we can examine if x Ganger causes y just be interchanging them and carrying out 
this process again. There could be four probable outcomes: (a) x Granger causes y (b) y 
Granger causes (c) Both x and y granger causes the other and (d) neither of the variables 
Granger causes the other. 
In this paper, the causality tests among all the concerned variables are conducted. For 
this the following set of equations are estimated: 
tltltltltt uyyxxx     11110 ……………………………. (v)  
tltltltltt vxxyyy     11110 …………………………..(vi) 
We consider the above set of equations for all possible pairs of (x, y) series in the group. 
The reported F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis. After 
confirming the long run causalities between the variables considered in the model, the 
VECM approach provides the short run causal relationships. 
We resorted to using EViews 7.1 and STATA 15 software to execute the econometric 
tests throughout our paper. 
 
6. Results 
 
Results from the 3SLS regression analysis in the context of model (i) are reported in 
table 5. In light of the results, it can be seen that corruption has a positive relationship 
with HDI in case of all the three subpanels which coincides with the a priori 
expectations with corruption being a key socio-economic development impeding factor. 
This implies that corruption does affect the efficacy of the development policies within 
an economy which calls for effective measures to be taken in order to tackle corruption. 
Moreover, our results also reveal that the coefficient of trade is positive and statistically 
significant for the full panel as well as for the subpanels suggesting that a rise in the 
trade volumes in these nations get translated into an improvement in their HDI.   
The 3SLS estimation results in context of model (i) 
Endogenous Dependent Variable: HDI 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Full Panel Asian Panel African Panel LAC Panel 
Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. 
CPI 0.005 
(0.121) 
0.003 0.010* 
(0.001) 
0.010 0.009* 
(0.000) 
0.002 0.025* 
(0.000) 
0.004 
GDP -6.7E-6 
(0.198) 
5.28E-6 0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000* 
(0.000) 
8.9E-6 -2.85E-6 
(0.251) 
2.48E-6 
GOV -0.007* 
(0.000) 
0.001 0.004*** 
(0.057) 
0.002 -0.001 
(0.290) 
0.001 0.006* 
(0.000) 
0.002 
FAID 0.000 
(0.135) 
0.000 -0.001*** 
(0.090) 
0.001 0.000 
(0.774) 
0.000 -0.002 
(0.185) 
0.000 
FDI 0.003** 
(0.043) 
0.002 -0.001 
(0.903) 
0.005 -0.003* 
(0.000) 
0.001 -0.000 
(0.995) 
0.002 
TRADE -0.004*** 
(0.098) 
0.000 0.003* 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000* 
(0.005) 
0.000 
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CO2 0.107* 
(0.000) 
0.015 -0.133* 
(0.000) 
0.026 -0.012 
(0.346) 
0.013 0.050* 
(0.000) 
0.009 
R-squared 0.858 0.619 0.394 0.487 
Notes: Optimal lag selection is based on Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) 
           Probability values are reported in parentheses. 
          *, **, and *** denote statistical significances at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 presents the results from the 3SLS estimation of model (ii). According to the 
reported findings, it can be seen that the coefficients of corruption in the context of all 
the three subpanels are negative and statistically significant. This implies that 
corruption across the Asian, African and the LAC countries poses a significant threat to 
their environmental sustainability as a rise in the levels of corruption triggers the 
corresponding rise in the volume of CO2 emissions. In addition, the validity of the EKC 
hypothesis is found only in the context of the full panel and the LAC panel which is 
evident from the signs and statistical significance of the relevant slope coefficients of 
GDP and GDP2. In case of the full panel, the elasticity of per capita CO2 emissions with 
regard to per capita GDP is 0.00065 + 2(-0.0000000271) GDP. Thus, the threshold level of 
per capita GDP at the turning point of the inverted-U shaped EKC is estimated to be                        = 11,992.62 (current US $). Similarly, in case of the LAC subpanel, the 
elasticity of per capita CO2 emissions with regard to GDP per capita is 0.00069 + 2(-
0.0000000271) GDP. Thus, the corresponding threshold level of per capita GDP is 
estimated to be                          = 12,777.78 (current US$).  
 
Table 6: The 3SLS estimation results in context of model (ii) 
Endogenous Dependent Variable: CO2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Full Panel Asian Panel African Panel LAC Panel 
Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. 
GDP 0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000*** 
(0.060) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.892) 
0.000 0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
GDP2 -2.71E-8* 
(0.000) 
3.50E-9 2.87E-8* 
(0.000) 
6.78E-9 1.05E-7* 
(0.000) 
2.12E-8 -2.7E-8* 
(0.000) 
5.68E-9 
CPI 0.043 
(0.125) 
0.028 -0.162*** 
(0.077) 
0.092 -0.073** 
(0.018) 
0.031 -0.235* 
(0.001) 
0.069 
GOV 0.023** 
(0.035) 
0.011 0.011 
(0.581) 
0.021 0.017 
(0.213) 
0.013 -0.061*** 
(0.066) 
0.033 
FAID -0.006* 
(0.000) 
0.001 -0.028* 
(0.000) 
0.005 -0.006* 
(0.000) 
0.002 -0.009* 
(0.007) 
0.003 
FDI -0.054* 
(0.000) 
0.010 0.055 
(0.263) 
0.049 -0.022** 
(0.050) 
0.001 -0.036 
(0.313) 
0.036 
TRADE 0.010* 
(0.000) 
0.002 0.018* 
(0.000) 
0.002 0.001 
(0.655) 
0.003 0.690* 
(0.000) 
0.451 
R-squared 0.550 0.938 0.492 0.455 
Notes: Optimal lag selection is based on Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) 
           Probability values are reported in parentheses. 
          *, **, and *** denote statistical significances at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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In order to check the robustness of our findings, we also investigated the short and long 
run causal associations between the variables considered in the paper. Table 7 reports 
the VECM approach results in the context of model (i). The findings confirm a 
bidirectional causal nexus between CPI and HDI in context of the full panel while a 
unidirectional causality is found to be running from HDI to CPI in context of the 
African subpanel, in the short run. In contrast, no causal linkage between these two 
macroeconomic variables is found in the context of the Asian and the LAC subpanels. 
The estimated short run causal associations also reveal that FDI and TRADE influence 
HDI in context of the full panel and the African subpanel, respectively.   
Table 7: VECM results in context of model (i) 
Sources of Causation for Full Panel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(HDI) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) D(CO2) ECT 
D(HDI) - 5.186*** 
(0.075) 
0.377 
(0.828) 
1.604 
(0.448) 
2.132 
(0.344) 
6.957** 
(0.031) 
2.553 
(0.279) 
1.130 
(0.568) 
-0.000 
(0.314) 
D(CPI) 5.790*** 
(0.055) 
- 4.544 
(0.103) 
11.471** 
(0.003) 
0.789 
(0.674) 
0.242 
(0.886) 
2.165 
(0.339) 
1.746 
(0.418) 
-8.58E-05 
(0.882) 
D(GDP) 3.072 
(0.215) 
0.922 
(0.631) 
- 0.942 
(0,624) 
0.051 
(0.975) 
7.534** 
(0.023) 
0.637 
(0.727) 
9.303* 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
D(GOV) 3.359 
(0.186) 
0.621 
(0.733) 
3.228 
(0.199) 
- 11.115* 
(0.004) 
8.989** 
(0.011) 
3.218 
(0.200) 
1.320 
(0.517) 
0.000 
(0.475) 
D(FAID) 5.353*** 
(0.069) 
0.721 
(0.697) 
0.980 
(0.613) 
6.731** 
(0.035) 
- 11.177* 
(0.004) 
1.025 
(0.599) 
0.092 
(0.955) 
-0.067 
(0.001) 
D(FDI) 0.030 
(0.985) 
0.066 
(0.967) 
2.041 
(0.360) 
1.395 
(0.498) 
12.566* 
(0.002) 
- 2.964 
(0.227) 
2.834 
(0.243) 
-0.286 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 3.731 
(0.155) 
6.347** 
(0.041) 
13.960* 
(0.000) 
2.290 
(0.318) 
2.324 
(0.313) 
2.835 
(0.242) 
- 0.024 
(0.988) 
-0.005 
(0.151) 
D(CO2) 3.112 
(0.211) 
0.180 
(0.914) 
2.781 
(0.249) 
1.415 
(0.493) 
1.975 
(0.373) 
2.550 
(0.280) 
1.468 
(0.480) 
- 0.002 
(0.195) 
Sources of Causation for Asian Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(HDI) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) D(CO2) ECT 
D(HDI) - 1.069 
(0.586) 
1.113 
(0.573) 
0.491 
(0.782) 
0.479 
0.787 
1.267 
(0.531) 
4.434 
(0.109) 
0.385 
(0.825) 
9.23E-05 
(0.972) 
D(CPI) 0.361 
(0.835) 
- 4.540 
(0.103) 
3.216 
(0.200) 
1.364 
(0.506) 
2.766 
(0.251) 
3.346 
(0.188) 
2.697 
(0.260) 
-0.005 
(0.519) 
D(GDP) 1.813 
(0.404) 
4.031 
(0.133) 
- 0.676 
(0.713) 
0.715 
(0.700) 
7.658** 
(0.022) 
1.639 
(0.441) 
7.082** 
(0.029) 
-0.107 
(0.000) 
D(GOV) 1.008 
(0.604) 
0.509 
(0.776) 
1.088 
(0.580) 
- 3.426 
(0.180) 
0.643 
(0.725) 
0.938 
(0.626) 
0.246 
(0.884) 
-0.003 
(0.793) 
D(FAID) 5.681*** 
(0.058) 
0.432 
(0.806) 
1.375 
(0.503) 
0.647 
(0.724) 
- 1.320 
(0.517) 
0.503 
(0.778) 
2.719 
(0.257) 
0.005 
(0.344) 
D(FDI) 10.369* 
(0.006) 
0.675 
(0.714) 
8.585** 
(0.014) 
0.429 
(0.807) 
1.308 
(0.520) 
- 4.843*** 
(0.089) 
8.311** 
(0.016) 
-0.305 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 5.481*** 0.354 9.012** 2.746 0.062 0.436 - 3.268 -0.002 
19 
 
(0.065) (0.838) (0.011) (0.253) (0.962) (0.804) (0.195) (0.599) 
D(CO2) 2.130 
(0.345) 
5.847*** 
(0.054) 
7.074** 
(0.029) 
1.568 
(0.457) 
0.430 
(0.807) 
3.213 
(0.201) 
9.131** 
(0.010) 
- 0.082* 
(0.000) 
Sources of Causation for African Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(HDI) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) D(CO2) ECT 
D(HDI) - 3.986 
(0.136) 
2.401 
(0.301) 
1.232 
(0.540) 
2.205 
(0.332) 
2.717 
(0.257) 
5.622*** 
(0.060) 
0.766 
(0.682) 
-0.000 
(0.381) 
D(CPI) 6.436** 
(0.040) 
- 0.763 
(0.683) 
12.182* 
(0.002) 
0.502 
(0.778) 
0.247 
(0.884) 
1.738 
(0.419) 
0.712 
(0.700) 
-0.004 
(0.531) 
D(GDP) 0.546 
(0.761) 
0.965 
(0.617) 
- 0.147 
(0.929) 
5.136*** 
(0.077) 
3.979 
(0.137) 
0.428 
(0.807) 
2.240 
(0.326) 
0.000 
(0.245) 
D(GOV) 2.362 
(0.307) 
0.725 
(0.696) 
1.232 
(0.540) 
- 7.216** 
(0.027) 
6.631** 
(0.036) 
1.730 
(0.421) 
0.976 
(0.614) 
-0.000 
(0.383) 
D(FAID) 4.426 
(0.109) 
0.044 
(0.978) 
3.736 
(0.155) 
4.440 
(0.109) 
- 16.264* 
(0.000) 
1.469 
(0.480) 
0.023 
(0.989) 
-0.329* 
(0.000) 
D(FDI) 0.035 
(0.983) 
0.234 
(0.890) 
2.869 
(0.238) 
1.111 
(0.574) 
19.735* 
(0.000) 
- 3.763 
(0.152) 
0.993 
(0.609) 
-0.265* 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 1.957 
(0.376) 
6.288** 
(0.043) 
0.725 
(0.696) 
1.593 
(0.451) 
2.540 
(0.281) 
3.569 
(0.168) 
- 1.616 
(0.446) 
-0.005 
(0.282) 
D(CO2) 1.948 
(0.378) 
0.699 
(0.705) 
0.363 
(0.834) 
3.593 
(0.166) 
2.508 
(0.285) 
5.163*** 
(0.076) 
1.191 
(0.551) 
- -0.002** 
(0.045) 
Sources of Causation for LAC Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
 Short Run Long 
Run 
D(HDI) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) D(CO2) ECT 
D(HDI) - 1.787 
(0.409) 
0.115 
(0.944) 
2.551 
(0.279) 
0.558 
(0.756) 
0.396 
(0.820) 
0.174 
(0.917) 
3.188 
(0.203) 
-0.001 
(0.940) 
D(CPI) 2.256 
(0.324) 
- 4.905*** 
(0.086) 
0.396 
(0.820) 
0.033 
(0.984) 
0.257 
(0.879) 
3.412 
(0.182) 
0.639 
(0.727) 
0.000 
(0.982) 
D(GDP) 3.902 
(0.142) 
0.676 
(0.713) 
- 1.423 
(0.491) 
0.087 
(0.957) 
1.833 
(0.400) 
2.262 
(0.323) 
2.443 
(0.295) 
0.010 
(0.606) 
D(GOV) 11.731 
(0.003)* 
0.434 
(0.805) 
2.462 
(0.292) 
- 1.601 
(0.449) 
8.294** 
(0.016) 
0.949 
(0.622) 
0.577 
(0.749) 
-0.117** 
(0.014) 
D(FAID) 0.681 
(0.711) 
4.494 
(0.106) 
0.084 
(0.959) 
3.082 
(0.214) 
- 2.412 
(0.299) 
0.407 
(0.816) 
2.182 
(0.336) 
-0.020 
(0.194) 
D(FDI) 1.263 
(0.532) 
3.454 
(0.178) 
2.162 
(0.339) 
6.274* 
(0.043) 
0.080 
(0.961) 
- 1.774 
(0.412) 
46.489* 
(0.000) 
-1.633 
(0.000)* 
D(TR) 2.648 
(0.266) 
2.030 
(0.362) 
1.999 
(0.368) 
1.520 
(0.468) 
1.777 
(0.411) 
12.865* 
(0.002) 
- 8.694** 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
D(CO2) 6.777** 
(0.034) 
0.825 
(0.662) 
1.381 
(0.501) 
4.173 
(0.124) 
1.679 
(0.432) 
11.064* 
(0.004) 
0.947 
(0.623) 
- -0.294* 
(0.008) 
Notes: The Chi-square statistics for the explanatory variables are reported while the corresponding probabilities are given in the parentheses. The short run 
causality is determined by the statistical significance of the Chi-squares statistics. *, ** and ** denote the statistical significance of the Chi-squares 
statistics at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. 
 
Results from the VECM approach estimation in the case of model (ii) are reported in 
table 8. It can be seen that bidirectional causality between CPI and CO 2 and a 
unidirectional causality from CPI to CO2 exist in contexts of the Asian and the African 
subpanels, respectively. This implies that corruption is effective in influencing CO 2 
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emissions in countries belonging to these subpanels, putting their environmental 
sustainability into question. 
 
Table 8: VECM results in context of model (ii) 
Sources of Causation for Full Panel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(CO2) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) ECT 
D(CO2) - 2.734 
(0.255) 
0.305 
(0.859) 
1.383 
(0.501) 
1.493 
(0.474) 
2.690 
(0.261) 
1.141 
(0.565) 
0.002 
(0.141) 
D(CPI) 1.466 
(0.480) 
4.116 
(0.128) 
- 11.532* 
(0.003) 
1.431 
(0.489) 
0.271 
(0.873) 
2.173 
(0.338) 
-0.001 
(0.653) 
D(GDP) 9.585* 
(0.008) 
- 1.264 
(0.532) 
0.820 
(0.664) 
0.116 
(0.944) 
6.391** 
(0.041) 
0.782 
(0.0.677) 
-0.008 
(0.025)** 
D(GOV) 1.539 
(0.463) 
0.876 
(0.646) 
2.969 
(0.227) 
- 11.293* 
(0.004) 
10.056* 
(0.007) 
3.508 
(0.173) 
-0.000 
(0.175) 
D(FAID) 0.082 
(0.960) 
0.868 
(0.648) 
1.120 
(0.571) 
6.085** 
(0.048) 
- 15.079* 
(0.001) 
0.731 
(0.694) 
-0.112* 
(0.000) 
D(FDI) 3.081 
(0.214) 
0.115 
(0.944) 
2.841 
(0.242) 
1.765 
(0.414) 
16.184* 
(0.000) 
- 3.035 
(0.219) 
-0.263* 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 0.043 
(0.979) 
5.798*** 
(0.055) 
13.841* 
(0.001) 
2.352 
(0.309) 
2.762 
(0.251) 
2.741 
(0.254) 
- -0.004 
(0.178) 
Sources of Causation for Asian Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(CO2) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) ECT 
D(CO2) - 6.894** 
(0.032) 
8.751** 
(0.013) 
0.808 
(0.668) 
0.335 
(0.846) 
1.552 
(0.460) 
14.749* 
(0.001) 
0.065* 
(0.000) 
D(CPI) 6.995** 
(0.030) 
- 3.210 
(0.201) 
0.288 
(0.866) 
0.684 
(0.710) 
4.104 
(0.129) 
1.486 
(0.476) 
-0.099* 
(0.000) 
D(GDP) 2.199 
(0.333) 
5.103*** 
(0.078) 
- 2.936 
(0.230) 
1.029 
(0.598) 
3.452 
(0.178) 
3.253 
(0.197) 
-0.022 
(0.132) 
D(GOV) 0.097 
(0.953) 
0.546 
(0.761) 
0.935 
(0.627) 
- 3.340 
(0.188) 
0.559 
(0.756) 
1.770 
(0.413) 
0.001 
(0.982) 
D(FAID) 1.718 
(0.424) 
0.233 
(0.890) 
1.544 
(0.462) 
0.760 
(0.684) 
- 2.251 
(0.324) 
0.897 
(0.639) 
0.007 
(0.400) 
D(FDI) 0.382 
(0.683) 
0.182 
(0.913) 
6.900** 
(0.032) 
0.299 
0.861 
1.731 
(0.421) 
- 2.763 
(0.251) 
-0.046** 
(0.025) 
D(TR) 5.003*** 
(0.082) 
0.550 
(0.760) 
10.810* 
(0.005) 
3.342 
(0.188) 
0.043 
(0.979) 
0.957 
(0.620) 
- -0.006 
(0.439) 
Sources of Causation for African Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
Short Run Long 
Run 
D(CO2) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) ECT 
D(CO2) - 1.004 
(0.605) 
0.514 
(0.774) 
3.277 
(0.194) 
2.324 
(0.313) 
5.125*** 
(0.077) 
1.276 
(0.528) 
-0.002** 
(0.031) 
D(CPI) 0.591 
(0.744) 
- 0.583 
(0.747) 
11.417* 
(0.003) 
1.452 
(0.484) 
0.324 
(0.850) 
1.794 
(0.408) 
-0.007 
(0.330) 
D(GDP) 2.204 
(0.332) 
1.003 
(0.606) 
- 0.104 
(0.949) 
4.465 
(0.107) 
4.595 
(0.101) 
0.534 
(0.766) 
0.000 
(0.364) 
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D(GOV) 1.002 
(0.607) 
1.013 
(0.603) 
0.929 
(0.628) 
- 8.123** 
(0.017) 
6.662** 
(0.036) 
2.209 
(0.331) 
-0.001 
(0.281) 
D(FAID) 0.024 
(0.988) 
0.042 
(0.979) 
4.681*** 
(0.096) 
3.811 
(0.149) 
- 16.557* 
(0.000) 
1.234 
(0.540) 
-0.354* 
(0.000) 
D(FDI) 0.992 
(0.609) 
0.311 
(0.856) 
3.030 
(0.220) 
1.219 
(0.544) 
19.375* 
(0.000) 
- 3.454 
(0.178) 
-0.242* 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 1.683 
(0.431) 
5.697*** 
(0.058) 
0.938 
(0.626) 
1.919 
(0.383) 
2.822 
(0.244) 
3.509 
(0.173) 
- -0.003 
(0.273) 
Sources of Causation for LAC Subpanel 
Dep. 
Var. 
 Short Run Long Run 
D(CO2) D(CPI) D(GDP) D(GOV) D(FAID) D(FDI) D(TR) ECT 
D(CO2) - 1.208 
(0.547) 
1.416 
(0.493) 
5.863*** 
(0.053) 
 
0.862 
(0.650) 
3.067 
(0.216) 
2.700 
(0.259) 
8.7E-05 
(0.189) 
D(CPI) 1.213 
(0.545) 
- 2.500 
(0.287) 
1.315 
(0.518) 
0.273 
(0.872) 
1.171 
(0.557) 
1.793 
(0.408) 
0.017 
(0.042) 
D(GDP) 5.111*** 
(0.078) 
0.186 
(0.911) 
- 0.478 
(0.787) 
0.037 
(0.982) 
1.734 
(0.420) 
1.372 
(0.504) 
-0.015*** 
(0.094) 
D(GOV) 5.072*** 
(0.079) 
1.482 
(0.477) 
6.963** 
(0.031) 
- 0.966 
(0.617) 
3.674 
(0.159) 
0.091 
(0.956) 
-0.007 
(0.538) 
D(FAID) 0.555 
(0.758) 
4.811*** 
(0.093) 
0.272 
(0.873) 
3.521 
(0.172) 
- 5.371*** 
(0.068) 
0.428 
(0.807) 
-0.094* 
(0.002) 
D(FDI) 13.559* 
(0.001) 
2.170 
(0.338) 
2.360 
(0.307) 
5.856*** 
(0.054) 
4.154 
(0.125) 
- 1.103 
(0.576) 
-0.246* 
(0.000) 
D(TR) 1.583 
(0.453) 
1.914 
(0.384) 
12.506* 
(0.002) 
0.412 
(0.814) 
1.903 
(0.386) 
0.007 
(0.996) 
- -0.020 
(0.336) 
    Notes: The Chi-square statistics for the explanatory variables are reported while the corresponding probabilities are given in the parentheses. The short 
run causality is determined by the statistical significance of the Chi-squares statistics. *, ** and ** denote the statistical significance of the Chi-
squares statistics at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. 
 
Finally, the Granger causality results provide evidence of possible long run causal 
associations between the variables considered in the paper. The Granger causality 
results in the context of model (i), as presented in table 9, suggest bidirectional causal 
associations between CPI and HDI in context of the full panel and the African subpanel 
while a unidirectional causality running from HDI to CPI is seen to hold in the context 
of the LAC subpanel. The results imply that corruption, in the long run, can effectively 
stimulate changes in socioeconomic development in the context of the full panel and the 
African subpanel only. Moreover, in context of the Asian subpanel, none of the 
explanatory variables are effective in influencing HDI movements in the long run.   
Table 9: The Granger causality test results for model (i) 
Panel/Subpanel Full Asia Africa LAC 
Null Hypothesis F-Stat. F-Stat. F-Stat. F-Stat. 
CPI does not Granger cause HDI  24.717 
(0.000)* 
1.845 
(0.163) 
17.912 
(0.000)* 
0.860 
(0.425) 
HDI does not Granger cause CPI  4.434 
(0.012)** 
1.019 
(0.365) 
4.586 
(0.011)** 
3.038 
(0.050)** 
GDP does not Granger cause HDI  0.465 
(0.628) 
0.100 
(0.905) 
1.066 
(0.345) 
0.0700 
(0.932) 
HDI does not Granger cause GDP 9.268 
(0.000)* 
3.174 
(0.046)* 
0.525 
(0.592) 
3.047 
(0.05)** 
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GOV does not Granger cause HDI 2.753 
(0.064)*** 
0.725 
(0.487) 
2.000 
(0.137) 
0.706 
(0.495) 
HDI does not Granger cause GOV 2.294 
(0.100)*** 
0.854 
(0.429) 
1.945 
(0.145) 
2.150 
(0.119) 
FAID does not Granger cause HDI  1.561 
(0.211) 
0.103 
(0.902) 
1.561 
(0.212) 
0.074 
(0.929) 
HDI does not Granger cause FAID 13.287 
(0.000)* 
1.694 
(0.189) 
0.142 
(0.868) 
2.898 
(0.058) 
FDI does not Granger cause HDI 1.203 
(0.301) 
0.636 
(0.532) 
0.438 
(0.646) 
0.694 
(0.501) 
HDI does not Granger cause FDI  0.658 
(0.518) 
2.272 
(0.108) 
0.291 
(0.748) 
2.016 
(0.136) 
TR does not Granger cause HDI 2.491 
(0.084)*** 
1.878 
(0.158) 
3.441 
(0.033)** 
0.415 
(0.661) 
HDI does not Granger cause TR 0.813 
(0.444) 
3.349 
(0.039)* 
0.320 
(0.727) 
0.178 
(0.838) 
CO2 does not Granger cause HDI 0.161 
(0.851) 
0.809 
(0.448) 
0.323 
(0.725) 
1.132 
(0.325) 
HDI does not Granger cause CO2 2.676 
(0.070)*** 
1.036 
(0.359) 
1.963 
(0.142) 
1.123 
(0.328) 
     Notes: The long run causality between the variables is determined by the statistical significance of the estimated F-statistics. The p-values are given 
inside the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the estimated F-statistics at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. The 
optimal lag 2 is automatically selected by the EViews 7.1 software.   
Table 10 provides the Granger causality test results in the context of model (ii)1. 
According to the estimations, a unidirectional causality running from CPI to CO 2 is 
found to be present in the context of the full panel. This implies that corruption 
influences environmental impacts in the corresponding nations as a whole. In addition, 
a unidirectional causality running from CO2 to CPI is seen to exist in the context of the 
subpanel of the Asian countries. A possible reason behind this finding could be the fact 
that as the volume of CO2 emissions increases, the parties responsible for contributing 
to such emissions get involved in corruptive activities offering a bribe to the 
environmental pollution control authorities in order to avoid possible legal actions.  
Table 10: The Granger causality test results for model (ii) 
Panel/Subpanel Full Asia Africa LAC 
Null Hypothesis  F-Stat. F-Stat. F-Stat. F-Stat. 
GDP does not Granger cause CO2 0.557 
(0.573) 
1.570 
(0.213) 
0.539 
(0.584) 
0.860 
(0.425) 
CO2 does not Granger cause GDP 7.972 
(0.000)* 
5.811 
(0.004)* 
3.765 
(0.024)** 
3.038 
(0.050)** 
CPI does not Granger cause CO2 2.636 
(0.072)*** 
0.460 
(0.632) 
1.471 
(0.231) 
0.706 
(0.495) 
CO2 does not Granger cause CPI  0.759 
(0.469) 
3.633 
(0.030)* 
0.272 
(0.762) 
2.150 
(0.119) 
GOV does not Granger cause CO2 0.175 
(0.839) 
0.015 
(0.986) 
1.216 
(0.298) 
0.074 
(0.929) 
CO2 does not Granger cause GOV 1.704 1.198 1.002 2.898 
                                                                 
1
 The GDP squared term is excluded from model (i i) intentionally since the motive is to analyze the causal 
relationship between HDI and its determinants in a l inear framework. 
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(0.183) (0.306) (0.368) (0.058)*** 
FAID does not Granger cause CO2 0.886 
(0.413) 
0.031 
(0.970) 
1.149 
(0.318) 
0.694 
(0.501) 
CO2 does not Granger cause FAID 7.022 
(0.001)* 
1.052 
(0.353) 
0.787 
(0.456) 
2.016 
(0.136) 
FDI does not Granger cause CO2 0.220 
(0.803) 
1.012 
(0.367) 
0.671 
(0.512) 
0.415 
(0.661) 
CO2 does not Granger cause FDI  1.141 
(0.320) 
10.859 
(0.000)* 
1.319 
(0.269) 
0.178 
(0.838) 
TR does not Granger cause CO2 2.854 
(0.058)*** 
1.716 
(0.185) 
2.371 
(0.095)*** 
1.132 
(0.325) 
CO2 does not Granger cause TR 0.056 
(0.945) 
1.517 
(0.224) 
0.003 
(0.997) 
1.123 
(0.328) 
    Notes: The long run causality between the variables is determined by the statistical significance of the estimated F-statistics. The p-values are given inside 
the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance of the estimated F-statistics at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. The optimal 
lag 2 is automatically selected by the EViews 7.1 software. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Corruption is believed to be a menacing factor that can hold up the SDG attainment by 
2030 across the globe. Thus, the focal point of our paper was to empirically analyze the 
possible detrimental effects of corruption which are responsible for impeding 
socioeconomic and environmental sustainability across selected countries from Asian, 
African and the LAC regions. The results generated in this paper could potentially 
stimulate adoption of anti-corruption measures that can be effective in the better 
channeling of public service deliveries and implementation of key environmental acts 
as well. In light of our findings, we can conclude that incidence of corruption in the 
context of the three subpanels exhibit adverse impacts on the socioeconomic 
development in the associated countries. Thus, our results corroborate to the 
conclusions by Gupta et al. (2000) in which the authors asserted that a rise in the CPI 
hampers public allocations in the health and education sectors affecting human 
development in a panel of developed and developing countries.  
Our results also revealed that corruption puts environmental sustainability into 
question since it triggers CO2 emission in context of all the three subpanels. This is in 
line with the findings by Ünver and Koyuncu (2017). A logical explanation of this 
positive interconnectedness between corruption and environmental degradation would 
be the fact that as corruption increases, enforcement of anti-corruption laws gets stalled 
following acceptance of a bribe by the associated law and enforcement authorities. 
Moreover, our estimated results also provide evidence regarding the validity of the 
EKC hypothesis in the context of the full panel and the LAC panel whereby the 
respective threshold level of per capita GDP are 11992.62 and 12777.78 US dollars 
(current). Thus, it is advisable for countries with GDP per capita less than these 
estimated thresholds to adopt relevant policies to enhance economic growth. Our paper 
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also finds short run bidirectional causality between corruption and socioeconomic 
development in the context of all the countries cumulatively which did not hold to be 
true in the long run. Furthermore, corruption and CO2 emissions portray short 
bidirectional causality in context of the selected Asian economies and a unidirectional 
causality running from corruption to CO2 emission for all the economies as a whole. 
Data constraint was one of the main limitations faced in this study restricting 
incorporation of disaggregated indicators of socioeconomic development in our set of 
simultaneous equations model. Moreover, the aforementioned limitation was also 
responsible for our period of study being small compared to other empirical analyses 
available in the literature. As part of the future scope of research, the nexus between 
corruption and socioeconomic and environmental sustainability can be reexamined in 
the context of more countries using disaggregated data and other robust methodologies 
for robustness check.        
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Appendix 
Table 11: List of countries considered in our paper 
South and South Asia Kenya Zimbabwe 
Bangladesh Madagascar Latin America and Caribbean 
India Malawi Argentina 
Indonesia Mali Brazil 
Malaysia Mauritius Chile 
Pakistan Mozambique Costa Rica 
Philippines Namibia Ecuador 
Sri Lanka Niger El Salvador 
Thailand Nigeria Haiti 
Sub Saharan Africa Republic of Congo Jamaica 
Angola Senegal Mexico 
Botswana Sierra Leone Panama 
Cameroon Somalia Paraguay 
Central African Republic South Africa Peru 
Chad Sudan Uruguay 
Gambia Tanzania Venezuela 
Ghana Uganda  
 
